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A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons 
Systems and Other Killing Machines  
Emily Jones1 
In this article, I critique the current debates surrounding autonomous weapons systems, 
using feminist posthuman theory to make sense of such systems – and the relation between 
human and machine – in terms of automation and autonomy. The dominant narratives about 
autonomous weapons tend to present them as exceptional; distinct from all the other kinds of 
human inventions that can kill. Further attention is required, not on autonomous weapons 
themselves but on the delegation of killing to a far broader range of technologies across the 
human-machine/autonomous-automated spectrum. While current attempts at legal regulation 
distinguish between civil and military technologies, such a distinction becomes impossible in 
light of the links between civil and military technologies and the killing potential of many 
technologies, including artificial intelligence. 
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1.0 Feminist Posthuman Theory and Xenofeminism
2
 
 
Global military spending has been estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) to have been around US$1.6 trillion in 2016.3 The military economy is not, 
however, just about state spending: direct and indirect employment within the U.S. aerospace 
and defence industry alone includes approximately 3.53 million people.4 Feminist scholars 
have highlighted how militarism goes further in that there are a number of key roles often 
played by women outside the formal work place.5 Militarisation can be seen as both creating 
and profiting from informal (unpaid) work by women, which also produces and maintains 
gender difference. 
In addition, military spending benefits companies. It does not, as two peace scholars point 
out, ‘compete directly with private investment. It supplements but does not supplant the 
private sector. Thus, its expansion will not undermine business confidence’.6 The military 
economy is a fast-moving one, creating continuous profits as technology advances and 
systems need replacing.7 Military development spending has increased over the past decade 
in many states including the U.S., Kenya, Brazil, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Poland and 
Russia.8 
Much of this war economy is driven by the development and deployment of technology, 
which reaps profits not only through military use but also often later through civil use. 
Satellite navigation is a prime example of this.9 While existing weapons systems such as the 
PAC-3 and the Samsung SGR-A1 described below are more automated than autonomous, 
‘there are significant global efforts in the research and development (R&D) of autonomous 
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 While Haraway is wary of naming herself a posthumanist due to her wish, not to become post-human but 
rather to de-centre the human and look towards multi-species becoming, I have defined her as such. This is 
because her concerns and perspectives align with the type of posthumanism I use in this thesis and which others, 
such as Braidotti, use, i.e. a posthumanism which both works in continuum with and beyond humanism itself. 
See; Donna Haraway, ‘Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’ (2016) 75 e-flux 
<http://www.e-flux.com/journal/75/67125/tentacular-thinking-anthropocene-capitalocene-chthulucene/> 
(accessed 26 November 2017); Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Polity Press 2013) 38. 
In addition to this, Helen Hester, one member of the xenofeminist collective Laboria Cuboniks, has also 
expressed that she does not see xenofeminism as aligning with posthumanism. Again, however, I define 
xenofeminism as posthuman in the postructuralist-inspired sense of posthumanism - there are clear cross-overs 
between the two. See Helen Hester and Diann Bauer, Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation paper presented at 
SOAS, University of London, 11 January 2018. 
See also Laboria Cuboniks, Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation (online) <http://www.laboriacuboniks.net/> 
(accessed 21 September 2017). 
3
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database (online) 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (last accessed 02 December 
2017). Statistic taken from global military expenditure from the year 2016 (latest figure in current US$). 
4
 Deloitte report sponsored by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), The Aerospace and Defence 
Industries in the U.S. (online) 2012 <http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=126226cd-
bc54-4e4b-a9ec-1ea16e61a2dd> (accessed 11 March 2016). Statistic is for the year 2010.  
5
 Cynthia Enloe, Maneuverers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (California University 
Press 2000) at 44. 
6
 Miroslav Nincic and Thomas R. Cusack, ‘The Political Economy of US Military Spending’ (1979) 6(2) 
Journal of Peace Research 101 at 112. 
7
 Nincic and Cusack, as above at 112; P. Dunne, ‘The Political Economy of Military Expenditure: An 
Introduction’ (1990) 14 Cambridge Journal of Economics 395 at 398. 
8
 SIPRI above note 3. 
9
 Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board et al, The Global Positioning System: A Shared National Asset 
(National Academies Press 1995). 
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systems’.10 Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have seen considerable 
advancement in the commercial sector, which is leaving the military sector behind.11 States 
are beginning to note the need to “catch up with Silicon Valley”.12 Seeking to tap into the 
advancements made in the commercial sector, the creation of weapons systems with some 
level of autonomy has recently become a key focus for the U.S. Department of Defense 
through Project Maven. When establishing the project in 2017, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert O. Work stated that ‘the Department of Defense (DoD) must integrate 
artificial intelligence and machine learning more effectively across operations to maintain 
advantages over increasingly capable adversaries and competitors’.13 While Project Maven is 
currently focusing on the incorporation of algorithms into military operations, reflecting the 
current state of technological advancement, it seeks to consider and promote  ‘all initiatives 
that develop, employ, or field, artificial intelligence, automation, machine learning, deep 
learning and computer vision algorithms’.14 In other words, Project Maven is not only 
creating more complex algorithms but is also actively seeking to ensure that the U.S. is at the 
forefront of the development of autonomous weapons technologies. 
In this paper I argue that feminist posthumanist theory is an important paradigm through 
which to understand our relationship to technology, and to autonomous weapons systems in 
particular. Feminist posthumanism uses technology (alongside the nonhuman animal and 
matter) to question what it means to be human, deconstructing the very notion of what the 
human is, noting that the concept of the human in dominant Western accounts of subjectivity 
creates hierarchies between humans as well as between the human and other living beings.15 
A clear example of the way in which feminist posthuman theory challenges humanist 
accounts of subjectivity can be seen in Donna Haraway’s work. Haraway notes that humans 
are already cyborgs in that they are deeply connected to, desire, and are dependent upon 
technology.16 Such an understanding of technology is essential to understanding autonomous 
weapons systems. In noting the connection between the human and machine and 
deconstructing distinctions between autonomy and automation, a posthuman perspective on 
autonomous weapons foregrounds the need to focus not only on autonomous weapons but on 
the broad array of delegated killing. While current attempts at legal regulation distinguish 
between civil and military technologies, such a distinction becomes impossible in light of the 
clear links between civil and military technologies and the killing potential of many 
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 M.L. Cummings, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare’ (2017) Chatham House 1 at 9. Available 
online at <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-
intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2018). 
11
 Cummings as above. 
12
 Stew Magnusun, DoD Making Big Push to Catch Up on Artificial Intelligence (online) 13 June 2017 
<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/6/13/dod-making-big-push-to-catch-up-on-artificial-
intelligence> (accessed 18 February 2018). 
The active inclusion of commercial players and researchers is also the aim of the U.S. Defense Enterprise 
Science Initiative (DESI). See MeriTalk, DoD Wants to Expand Collaboration with Industry (online) 12 January 
2018 <https://www.meritalk.com/articles/dod-wants-to-expand-collaboration-with-industry/> (accessed 18 
February 2018). 
13
 Robert O. Work, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum on the Establishment of an Algorithmic 
Warfare Cross-Functional Team (Project Maven) 26 April 2017. Available online at 
<https://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/establishment_of_the_awcft_project_maven.pdf. 
(accessed 18 February 2018). 
14
 As above. 
15
 See generally, Braidotti above note 2; Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (eds) Material Feminisms (Indiana 
University Press 2008). 
16
 Donna Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ in David Bell and Barbara M. Kennedy (eds) The Cybercultures 
Reader (Routledge 2001) 291. 
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technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI).17 This article therefore contributes to legal 
studies as well as the discourse on autonomous weapons. It further contributes to feminist 
approaches to international law, inserting such approaches into the realm of military 
technologies and highlighting the relevance of feminist approaches to all areas of 
international law.18 
Law and gender theory is an important lens through which to analyse military technologies.19 
Military technologies touch on several political and philosophical issues that gender theorists 
have long discussed. Legal articulations of subjectivity in particular are something that 
feminist legal theory has long problematised, and is directly relevant to the question of the 
‘legal person’ as machines become more and more autonomous.20 This may require legal 
change to allow for ‘electronic’ subject-recognition.21 In addition to this, gender theories have 
developed a nuanced set of tools through which to analyse issues around inclusion, exclusion 
and justice. This can be seen in gender theory’s commitment to intersectionality, which looks 
at gender alongside race, sexuality, ability, class, etc.22 A gender perspective ensures the 
consideration of  the multiple ways in which technologies may impact on intersecting groups, 
which may be missed in mainstream discussions about the use of autonomous weapons 
systems. 
Despite the many debates on autonomous weapons, there has been little consideration of such 
systems from a feminist posthuman perspective.23 Mary Manjikian appears to be the only 
                                                          
17
 For example, while the European Parliament has called for the greater regulation of new technologies, their 
proposals specifically focus on civil technologies. The resolution does not seek to address military technologies 
and the issues they may pose, thus posing the civil and the military as distinct. See European Parliament 
Resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 
(2015/2103(INL)). 
Cummings has noted that commercial developments in technology are likely soon to be so high tech that the 
regulation of military technologies may become nonsensical given the ways in which commercial tech could 
potentially soon be easily moderated and developed. See Cummings above note 10. 
18
 See Hilary Charlesworth, Gina Heathcote and Emily Jones, ‘Feminist Scholarship on International Law in the 
1990s and Today: An Inter-Generational Conversation between Hilary Charlesworth, Gina Heathcote and Emily 
Jones’ (Forthcoming 2018) Feminist Legal Studies. 
19
 Yoriko Otomo’s work is key in seeking to note the links between technological development, military 
technologies and the post-war international law settlement, analysing these things from a feminist perspective. 
See Yoriko Otomo, Unconditional Life: The Postwar International Law Settlement (Oxford University Press 
2016). 
20
 Ngaire Naffine, ‘The Body Bag’ in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary Owens (eds) Sexing the Subject of Law 
(LBC Information Services 1997) 79; Anna Grear, ‘‘Sexing the Matrix’: embodiment, disembodiment and the 
law – towards the re-gendering of legal rationality’ in Jackie Jones, Anna Grear, Rachel Anne Fenton and Kim 
Stevenson (eds) Gender, Sexualities and Law (Routledge 2011) 39; Ngaire Naffine, ‘Women and the Cast of 
Legal Persons’ in Jackie Jones, Anna Grear, Rachel Anne Fenton and Kim Stevenson (eds) Gender, Sexualities 
and Law (Routledge 2011) 15. 
21
 For example, the European Parliament has called for the recognition of ‘electronic persons’. See; European 
Parliament above note 17. 
22
 See for example Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color’(1991) 43(6) Stanford Law Review 1241; Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race & Class 
(Ballantine Books 2011); Sadie Wearing, Yasmin Gunaratnam and Irene Gedalof, ‘Frailty and Debility’ (2015) 
111(1) Feminist Review 1; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Routledge 2006). 
23
 On some of these debates see, for example, Robert Sparrow, ‘Robots and respect: Assessing the case against 
Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2016) 30(1) Ethics and International Affairs 93; Peter Asaro, ‘On Banning 
Autonomous Weapons Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-
Making’ (2012) 94(886) International Review of the Red Cross 687; Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality 
and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (Routledge 2009); Benjamin Kastan, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems: 
A Coming Legal Singulaity’  (2013) 1 45; Marcus Schulzke, 'Autonomous Weapons and Distributed 
Responsibility’ (2013) 26(2) Philosophy & Technology 203; Jack M. Beard, ‘Autonomous Weapons and 
5 
 
scholar who has sought to apply feminist posthumanism to the realm of autonomous 
technology.24 Manjikian discusses the ways in which military technologies may be used to 
create either a less or a more militarised world, concluding that technology is more likely to 
create a more militarised, hyper-masculine world.25 Heeding Manjikian’s suspicion of the 
hyper-masculinity of militarism, this article works in the vein of Haraway and other feminist 
posthuman thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti and the ‘xenofeminists’, a collective of scholars 
working under the name ‘Laboria Cuboniks’ who seek to use and appropriate technology for 
feminist aims – to think critically about the significance of autonomous weapons systems, for 
the ways in which law fashions our understanding of human subjectivity.26 This paper adds to 
the discourse on autonomous weapons by proposing a xenofeminist posthuman perspective, 
providing a different way of understanding these systems while contributing to the 
development of feminist approaches to international law.  
While Haraway is fundamentally positive about technology’s potential to be used for feminist 
aims, she notes that feminists must also ensure that technology is not used to create ‘the final 
abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defence, about the 
final appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war.’27  Haraway also notes 
that technology is embedded within capitalism, pointing out the fact that the people usually 
making the machines are often poor women from the Global South.28 Haraway’s work seeks 
to create a feminist techno-future in spite of and while trying to avoid the risks of a possible 
hyper-masculine techno-future. While Haraway seeks to promote the use of technology for 
feminist aims, the Xenofeminist Manifesto (XFM) has a more focused feminist project in 
mind. The XFM seeks to destroy capitalism through the accelerated use of technology to 
create a post-work world, thereby directly advocating for post-capitalism as a feminist aim.29 
Thus, the XFM insists not only on the need to accelerate our use of/dependence upon 
technology, but also to appropriate this technology for feminist aims, ensuring that such 
technology remains loyal to the politics they wish it to promote. Such feminist aims include 
the will to ensure the free distribution of hormones or the will to use technology to re-
structure gendered systems of reproductive labour and care.30 While the xenofeminists note 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Human Responsibilities’ (2014) 45(3) 617; Heather M. Roff, ‘The Strategic Robot Problem: Leathal 
Autonomous Weapons in War’ (2014) 13(3) 211; Peter Scharre, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk’ 
(2016) Ethical Autonomy Project 1. 
24
 Mary Manjikian, ‘Becoming Unmanned: The Gendering of Lethal Autonomous Warfare Technology’ (2014) 
16(1) International Feminist Journal of Politics 48. 
25
 Manjikian as above. 
26
 The Xenofeminist Manifesto, an online manifesto released in 2015 which was written by a collective of 
unnamed scholars and practitioners, is the only current text on xenofeminism outside of interviews and talks 
given by some of the collective. One of the members of the collective, however, Helen Hester, does soon have a 
book coming out about xenofeminism. See Laboria Cuboniks, above note 2; Helen Hester, Xenofeminism 
(Polity Press forthcoming 2018). 
In addition to this, feminist posthumanist scholar Rosi Braidotti discusses xenofeminism in her forthcoming 
book. See Rosi Braidotti, Posthuman Feminism (Polity Press forthcoming 2018). 
27
 Haraway above note 15 at 29; Anna Feigenbaum, ‘From cyborg feminism to drone feminism: Remembering 
women’s anti-nuclear activisms’ (2015) 16(3) Feminist Theory 265 at 271. 
28
 Haraway above note 16; For more on the inequalities of tech see also; Laboria Cuboniks above note 2 at 
Interrupt 0*08. 
29
 In addition to this, the XFM looks to overcome global inequalities by centring intersectionality, aiming to 
create a more just, post-capitalist world. See Laboria Cuboniks above note 2 at Interrupt 007, Carry 013, Zero 
0*00, Parity 00F. 
The XFM was written, in part, as a response to the Accelerate Manifesto. See; Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek, 
#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics (online) Critical Legal Thinking 2013 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/> (accessed 14 
February 2018). 
30
 Laboria Cuboniks as above at Carry 0*16. 
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the dilemmas technology brings and the need to ‘explicit[ly] acknowledge… these conditions 
as a target for elimination’, they do not address the fact that the creation of a post-capitalist 
world will not be not immediate.31 In the meantime, as Haraway notes, science and 
technology have both contributed to and changed the face of ‘late capitalism’, with more 
work becoming precarious and being done at home, which affects women and people of 
colour most.32 Technology is largely designed by (and profits) people who are white, male 
and living in the Global North, while the raw materials are mined and manufactured 
elsewhere, by others.33  
While some xenofeminist scholars propose the ubiquitous use of technology as the way to a 
feminist future, that future is less utopic when one considers that much technology is 
developed, first and foremost, for military purposes.34 While there has not yet been a feminist 
posthuman reading of autonomous weapons systems which seeks to dissect the false binaries 
upheld within the debates on these weapons between the human-machine and autonomy-
automation, there has been some limited engagement with these systems from a feminist 
perspective by NGOs, one example being the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom’s disarmament programme, ‘Reaching Critical Will’. They consider the masculine 
nature of militarism and the ways in which this would only likely get worse if machines 
stripped of empathy engage in killing, instead of soldiers in face-to-face combat.35  
It is interesting to note that many of the posthuman perspectives which currently exist on the 
topic of conflict and technology do come from a gender perspective. These works come from 
outside the legal discipline, however, and tend to focus on drone warfare.36 Posthuman 
theory, however, could have a key impact if applied to legal studies and the debates around 
autonomous weapons.37 In refusing to see the machine as other, noting the links between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
One way in which hormones can be appropriated, drawing on xenofeminist methods to re-appropriate science 
and technology and make it our own, can be through creating home grown hormones and teaching others the 
same know-how. The project Open Source Gender Codes is one such example of this. The project aims to create 
plants which would allow people to grow their own sex hormones at home. This project, if it or something like it 
succeeds, would not only massively challenge the pharmaceutical industry who produce these hormones, but 
would also allow people to make safe choices about whether or not they wish to take hormones outside the 
institutional contexts of the state and medicine. This could also, potentially, drastically change cultural attitudes 
to the taking of hormones, making transitioning more culturally acceptable due to its accessibility and lack of 
institutional framework. See Open Sources Gender Codes (online) 
<http://opensourcegendercodes.com/projects/osg/> (accessed 2 December 2017). 
On re-thinking care, see Hester and Bauer, above note 2. 
31
 As above at Interrupt 0*08. 
32
 Haraway above note 5. 
33
 This inequality is exemplified by the way in which facial recognition technology has recently been shown to 
have trouble recognising black faces, as it has been created by and for a white elite. 
See the Algorithmic Justice League, a project, led by Joy Buolamwini, which aims to fight bias in algorithms: 
<https://www.ajlunited.org/> (accessed 18 September 2017). 
34
 As was the case with Satellite Navigation technology. 
35
 Reaching Critical Will, WILPF Statement to the 2016 CC Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems (online) <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/statements/10788-wilpf-statement-to-the-2016-
ccw-meeting-of-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems> (accessed 13 February 2018). 
36
 See Cara Daggett, ‘Drone Disorientations: How “Unmanned” Weapons Queer the Experience of Killing in 
War’ (2015) 17(3) International Feminist Journal of Politics 361; Lauren Wilcox, ‘Drone warfare and the 
making of bodies out of place’ (2015) 3(1) Critical Studies on Security 127; Lauren Wilcox, ‘Embodying 
Algorithmic War: Gender, Race and the Posthuman in Warfare’ (2016) Security Dialogue 1; Lauren Wilcox, 
‘Drones, Swarms and Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias and Posthuman Politics’(2017) 116(1) Feminist 
Review 25. 
37
 While there have been those who note the need to pay attention to the delegation of decision-making to 
technologies, such approaches have not, as far as this author is aware, been applied in conjunction with 
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machine and the human, a posthuman approach would refuse the exceptionalism promoted by 
existing discourses on autonomous weapons, allowing for discussions to encompass a wider 
range of human-machine life/death decision-making. Killing machines may not be created as 
killer robots but may come into existence through other civil or military technological 
developments, such as artificial intelligence (AI) which may not have been designed to kill, 
but may ultimately be used to kill.38 More mundane but equally dangerous are developments 
in algorithm-driven decision-making.39 Further to this, given the vast advances in wearable 
military technologies and human enhancement technologies, a killer machine of the dystopian 
kind envisaged by many NGOs may, in fact, come about through technologically enhancing 
soldiers and turning them into superhuman soldiers. While such cyborg soldiers would not be 
deemed autonomous weapons under existing understandings of such systems, they will beg 
the same ethical questions around control and accountability, something which has not yet 
been recognised by the existing work on autonomous weapons. After all, at what point does a 
technologically mediated human become more machine than human? 
While job automation may indeed help create a post-work, post-capitalist society,40 such 
systems pose vast ethical issues around control and accountability. ‘Fully automated luxury 
communism’ seems less luxurious in the face of machines taking professional killing jobs.41 
Drawing on the XFM, this article concludes by proposing the need for a posthuman-
xenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons systems and other civil and military 
technologies. This means that we do not need to ‘abandon’ technology, but rather to use it 
warily, drawing on the wisdom of intersectional critiques and seeking a post-capitalist vision 
of society.42 This article therefore makes several key contributions. First, the paper adds to 
the debate on ‘autonomous’ weapons by challenging existing definitions of such systems. 
The paper also analyses the international debates on these systems from the as-yet unapplied 
perspective of posthuman-xenofeminism, highlighting both what feminist posthuman and 
xenofeminist theory may add to the debates on autonomous weapons systems. Further, this 
article adds to feminist approaches to international law by situating them within discussions 
of autonomous weapons, proposing a new posthuman-xenofeminist methodology for such 
approaches. I conclude that there is a need for feminist posthuman intervention into the legal 
regulation of all technologies – one that understands the ways in which humans-machines 
work in connection while seeking to prevent the creation of all killer machines, thereby 
refusing current attempts at technological legal regulation which distinguish between civil 
and military technologies.43  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
posthuman theory nor applied to autonomous weapons systems. See; Sheila Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention: 
Technology and the Human Future (W. W. Norton & Company 2016). 
38
 Nick Land, Meltdown (online) Cybernetic Culture Research Institute 
<http://www.ccru.net/swarm1/1_melt.htm> (last accessed 02 December 2017). Cummings has also noted how, 
in recent years, the commercial sector’s development of technologies has begun to outstrip military sector’s 
development. See Cummings above note 10. 
39
 Fleur Johns, ‘Global Governance through the Pairing and List of Algorithm’ (2016) 34(1) Environments and 
Planning D: Society and Space 126. 
40
 For more on this see; Williams and Srnicek, above note 29; Calum Chace, The Economic Singularity: 
Artificial Intelligence and the Death of Capitalism (Three Cs 2016). 
41
 See Aaron Bastani, Fully Automated Luxury Communism (Verso Books forthcoming 2018).  
42
 Haraway above note 16; Dianne Otto, ‘A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325’ (2006) 13(1) Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 113; 
Gina Heathcote, The Law on The Use of Force: A Feminist Analysis (Routledge 2012). 
43
 As per; European Parliament above note 17; Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Summary of CCW meetings in 
FAQs ahead of the CCW 2016 meeting on LAWS (online) 2016 
<http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdccw/> (accessed 8 April 2017). 
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2.0 Automation, the Autonomous and the Artificially Intelligent 
There are currently a few definitions for autonomous weapons. The U.S. and U.K. 
governments, the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Execution and Human 
Rights Watch all use a similar definition: ‘robotic weapon systems that, once activated, can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.’44 It is important 
to note that the definition must include ‘once activated’, as human control is always present 
when making and programming the machine. Full autonomy cannot be reached without the 
machines programming, designing and making themselves. Autonomous weapons are not 
drones. Drones are pilotless vehicles controlled remotely by humans. Autonomous weapons 
‘go considerably further than drones’:45 they would have no human guidance after being 
programmed, either being controlled through high-level algorithms or through artificial 
intelligence. Autonomous weapons thus potentially range from programmed sentry guns to 
intelligent humanoid soldier-robots. Whilst it is broadly agreed that autonomy has yet to be 
achieved, research is on-going in this area.46 Most agree that autonomous weapons do not yet 
exist. However, this is somewhat debatable depending on the way autonomy is defined. 
Robotic systems of varying levels of autonomy and lethality have already been deployed in 
numerous states.47 One such system includes the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system. 
The PAC system is able to select, target and hit incoming missiles, small aircraft and drones, 
without human intervention.48 The system does not operate entirely independently: up to 
three officers watch over it at all times from what is called an Engagement Control Centre 
(ECS). The operators can let the system run in automatic mode but they are able to intervene 
to deselect or choose targets. Human involvement is therefore present, but largely as a 
backup. Both the operator and computer are able to make decisions on whether an incoming 
entity is a friend or an enemy.49 Whilst the previous PAC-2 system relied on the ECS for 
guidance once launched, the latest PAC-3 missile also includes its own radar transmitter and 
guidance computer, allowing it to guide itself once launched and therefore allowing it to 
change course if necessary.50 
Perhaps one of the ‘most’ autonomous systems out there is the Samsung SGR-A1. The SGR-
A1 is an immobile sentry gun deployed on the border between North and South Korea.51 The 
system can detect potential enemies using infra-red up to 4km away. It uses a low light 
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 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, 
Christof Heynes UN Doc A/HRC/23/47 (9 April 2013), para. 38. See also U.S. Department of Defence, 
Autonomy in Weapons Systems Directive 3000.09 (21 November 2012); UK Ministry of Defence, The UK 
Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (30 March 2011); Human Rights 
Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots (2012) at 2. 
45
 UK House of Commons, HC Deb, 17 June 2013, c729,per Nia Griffith MP. 
46
 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CCW/MSP/2014, Para 21. 
47
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camera and pattern recognition software to determine whether a target is human, animal or 
matter. The SGR-A1 also uses voice recognition software to identify approaching persons. It 
can command someone to surrender and to not move closer. It can then, accordingly, when 
the person gets within 10m of the system, choose to sound an alarm or fire either rubber or 
real bullets. Whilst this decision is usually to be made by a human who watches over the 
system, the system does have a fully automatic mode where it can be set to decide itself.52 
While some automatic or semi-autonomous weapons systems clearly already exist and are in 
use, full autonomy is a long way off. Autonomy is distinguished from automation – with 
automated systems being pre-programmed machines used to perform specific tasks and 
autonomous machines being able to make decisions themselves in changing and diverse 
conditions, thus being able to select from multiple options as opposed to being predictable in 
their processes.53 Thus, whilst automated machines may be ‘making decisions’ whether to 
fire or not, they do not make thought out decisions as they ultimately work through binary 
algorithms in a specific, set environment, never learning from their behaviour. Automated 
systems supposedly do what they are told to do: they are predictable in as much as they will 
act as predicted within the set of conditions predicted when they were made. Thus, according 
to Jeangène Vilmer, the sorts of systems discussed above are automated, not autonomous.54 
Despite this, the debate as to whether these machines are actually automated or autonomous 
is contentious. Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany has highlighted the difficulties of 
definition here, noting that ‘there are a number of different proposals as to where to draw the 
line between “autonomous” and “automated”… and probably, our understanding as to where 
to draw this line will even evolve over time as technological advances are made’.55  
At the international level, levels of autonomy are discussed in terms of whether the system 
includes the human in, on or out-of-the-loop.56 Human-out-of-the-loop machines are 
machines which independently select targets without supervision. Jeangène Vilmer states that 
these machines only currently exist against solely material targets, with electronic jamming 
systems being an example.57 These types of systems are then distinguished from human-in-
the-loop systems and human-on-the-loop systems. Human-in-the-loop systems are systems 
where the decision to fire is made by a human, whereas human-on-the-loop is defined as 
those which ‘independently designate and process tasks while fully under the supervision of a 
human, capable of interrupting its actions’,58 PAC being an example here. All these 
categories sit somewhere between the lines of autonomy and automation. The debate around 
autonomous weapons at the international level, therefore, is mostly about whether human-
out-of-the-loop systems should be allowed and to what extent.  Human-out-of-the-loop 
systems are thus considered to be the dangerous types of machines, with the assumption 
being that these systems do not yet exist and that this paradigm amounts to autonomy. 
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However, whether autonomous weapons yet exist or not depends on perspective. Jeangène 
Vilmer, for example, defines PAC-3 as a human-on-the-loop system as it is fully automated 
yet always supervised by a human.59 The PAC-3 system, however, can independently select 
targets, decide whether a target is an enemy target or not, fire and accurately target even once 
released. Such a system could be defined as autonomous depending on how autonomy is 
defined. While the human does remain on-the-loop, the system does not require this to work. 
It seems that PAC-3, however, could possibly not be defined as autonomous as it works in 
specific conditions based on a set of algorithms as opposed to making complex decisions and 
learning. However, it is unclear at what point algorithmic programming may become so 
advanced that it becomes, in effect, a complex decision-making process. In addition, noting 
that a machine works on algorithms does not make that machine predictable, as shown by the 
Wikipedia algorithms which are correcting and deleting one another’s information in 
unforeseen ways.60 Machines and algorithms do not always work as they are supposed to, 
begging the question of at which point such unexpected algorithmic behaviour may amount 
to autonomy. Thus, as Jeangène Vilmer notes these three descriptions of human in/on/out the 
loop ‘simplif[y] matters and do… not take into account the fact that autonomy does not 
consist of three levels, but rather it is a continuum of many degrees’.61 These three categories 
are in many ways false and unhelpful. The same can be said, too, of definitions of autonomy 
and automation, in that ‘these two categories are neither mutually exclusive nor 
homogeneous. There is no absolute distinction between automation and autonomy, but rather 
a continuum between the two’.62 PAC-3 and SGR-A1 systems, for example, are already 
bridging this automated/autonomous distinction in that their programming is so complex that 
it can be seen as a very low level decision making process.  
Part of the problem with the autonomy debate is that it tries to separate the machine from the 
human from the outset. Either the human is in the loop and thus controlling the machine, or 
on the loop, prevailing with ultimate control, or out of the loop, thus posing the machine as 
‘other’, distinct and separate from the human. However, ultimately, these machines are all 
deeply connected to and work with the human in various ways, either through being operated 
by a human or, at the more advanced level, having been programmed by a human. 
Technology is changing the way we delegate tasks and make decisions but there is still 
human choice, even if in the programming alone. 
It is clear, however, that for a system to be fully autonomous, i.e. able to create itself and 
others, some form of high-level intelligence would be needed. Artificial intelligence (AI), 
although hard to define precisely, is the possibility of the creation of an intelligent artefact.63 
What intelligence means, however, is debatable. Theories include those which state that AI 
would have to be able to learn from experience to those which state that AI must be able to 
make connections and assumptions like a human can.64 The Turing Test is often cited here as 
an appropriate measure of intelligence. Created in the 1950s, the Turing Test states that a 
machine should be considered to be intelligent if a human believes it to be another human.65 
This test has been shown to be faulty, however, with Dennett highlighting how many people 
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can be easily tricked into believing a fairly simple machine is human.66 Yet as Ginsberg 
notes, the Turing Test may have its flaws – such as the human being too lazy to question the 
entity fully – yet it remains one of the most accepted tests of intelligence.67 Ginsberg argues 
that this is because the test is difficult and thus sets a ‘reasonably sharp description of 
intelligence’, requiring the machine to discuss a very broad array of subjects.68 The Turing 
Test, however, is a test of speech and not necessarily the other actions which may be deemed 
to constitute human intelligence, including eye contact and body language.69 Since the test’s 
creation in the 1950’s, however, technology has dramatically advanced. The test also seems 
somewhat less rigorous in an age where technology is challenging ideas of what it means to 
be human.70 In light of this, it seems that the Turing Test is not the only standard through 
which AI is and should be defined. What AI is and what it could constitute is hotly debated. 
If algorithms work as binaries between 0 and 1, it seems that AI, in making choices, would 
navigate these binaries. As noted above, however, the point at which binaries become so 
complex that they may constitute enough to be deemed intelligence remains unclear. 
AI plays a key role in theories of the singularity (the idea that machines will eventually 
surpass human intelligence), representing the possible superintelligence required for the 
singularity and an accelerated post-capitalist world to come about.71 Within weapons 
systems, however, AI presents a darker picture. A number of people have highlighted the 
risks around AI and the possibility that AI, whether created or not to kill, may choose to 
kill.72 In addition to this, AI as purposefully embedded into weapons technology would 
clearly move weapons systems towards ‘full’ autonomy of the kind where the robots may not 
only make decisions and learn but can also create and programme themselves. AI does not 
yet exist in the realm of autonomous weapons, although there are a number of AI 
programmes and machines (arguably) in existence that are also being developed and tested, 
again depending on one’s definition of AI.73 For the most part these programmes remain 
limited, lagging far behind what could feasibly be dubbed human intelligence with most 
machines able to perform only one specific task (even if they perform that task very well).74 
3.0 Legal-Ethico Debates on Autonomous Weapons Systems 
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To develop a feminist posthuman approach to autonomous weapons systems, there is a need 
to understand the existing debates concerning these systems. This section summarises the key 
debates in this area. 
Many groups have called for a pre-emptive ban of autonomous weapons. These groups 
include NGOs and the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Execution.75 Further 
to this, in 2015, over 20,000 AI, robotics and technology researchers and public intellectuals 
signed a letter calling for a ‘ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful 
human control’.76 Another ban was proposed in August 2017, this time by 116 robotics and 
AI company leaders from 26 countries.77  A number of states, notably all from the Global 
South, have also called for banning autonomous weapons, including Pakistan, Bolivia, Egypt 
and Ghana.78  Over seventy religious leaders have called for a ban.79 A number of 
philosophers have also joined the anti-group, arguing that machines should not be able to 
make life/death decisions.80 A group of twenty Nobel Peace Prize winners called for a ban in 
2014, and in the same year, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution calling 
on Ministers of the EU and the EU’s High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security to 
ban such weapons.81 
There are various legal, ethical and military debates around autonomous weapons.82 
Arguments include that the removal of humans from the field could drastically increase 
states’ willingness to go to war due to the heavily reduced risk of military casualties.83 Other 
arguments state that autonomous weapons could lead to a reduction in casualties as they do 
not have emotions and will thus never feel the need to uphold a ‘shoot first ask questions 
later’ policy.84 The larger legal concern about these systems is whether a machine would ever 
be able to uphold International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Humans already make mistakes and 
break IHL, and there is very little doubt that machines would as well. Whilst roboticist expert 
Ron Arkin has argued that machines may better uphold the standards of IHL than humans, 
such an argument lacks nuance.85 As Jeangène Vilmer notes, ‘roboticists often exaggerate 
their ability to program IHL and convert legal rules into algorithms. Non-jurists often have a 
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simplistic understanding of the rules, reducing them to univocal commands’.86  IHL does not 
apply through binary choices but rather requires a balanced assessment of principles, 
perspectives and ethical standpoints.87  
One example of the way in which IHL does not just apply mathematically can be seen in the 
principle of proportionality, which requires ‘incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects’ to be balanced against ‘the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’.88 Yet determining what is proportionate or not is not simply a matter of logic. 
Proportionality requires a deep understanding of nuance, as shown by the number of legal 
debates surrounding this principle.89 
Another part of IHL which requires applying a nuanced reflection can be found under Article 
57(2) of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which requires that 
the risk of civilian life should be minimised at all times and, in line with this, states must 
review the different forms an attack may take.90 In order to abide by international legal 
obligations, these machines would have to be able to determine whether targets are military 
targets or not (and thus whether humans are military personal or civilians) and to make 
assessments on how to reduce damage in the most effective way possible, a decision which 
requires extremely intelligent thinking. For example, determining whether something is a 
rifle or an umbrella from a distance can be difficult.91 Such a dilemma could not be easily 
evaded through creating a system which can read the code number on the side of weapons: 
first, this excludes analysis of unarmed civilians within the calculation, and second, not every 
person who carries a weapon is a combatant. In conflict situations, it can be common for 
civilians to carry weapons for self-defence, and if peacekeepers are present, they may also 
carry weapons, thus complicating identification more.92 Further, even if a system were able to 
distinguish effectively between combatants and non-combatants, it would then also need to 
be able to understand when someone surrenders, in line with IHL.93 It would also need to be 
able to determine when someone is seriously injured and split off from their group, thus 
making them an illegitimate target under IHL.94 It is difficult to imagine a machine being able 
to make decisions such as these without it being highly intelligent. 
Another key issue here is of accountability. Accountability when IHL is breached could be 
hard to determine where an autonomous weapon is involved, as the responsibility may lay 
across many actors. For example, if a machine kills an innocent person independently, should 
the military commanding the robot be held accountable? Or rather the manufacturer, the 
inventor, the commander, the programmer, or even in the case of AI machines, the robot 
itself? There is the further question of whether these machines are, in their very existence, 
compatible with IHL at all. Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 
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states that all weapons systems must be verified as compatible with IHL before being used.95 
This debate also invokes the Marten Clause, which states that ‘civilians and combatants 
remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience’.96 Whilst there is great debate as to what the Martens Clause means and how it 
exactly applies, it is questionable whether a machine being allowed to make life or death 
decisions may be in line with the principles of humanity and public conscience, with scholars 
taking positions on both sides of the debate.97 
There are many debates around the potential use of autonomous weapons. There have also 
been many proposals as to how to deal with them. As noted above, one proposal is to ban 
these systems. Bans are often justified on the basis of the need to retain ‘meaningful human 
control’,98 though there is little clarity around what constitutes human control.99 Any ban may 
prove difficult to enforce given the nuances in definition between autonomy and 
automation.100 Parties wanting autonomous weapons draw on the lack of definitional clarity 
to promote their own agendas.101 These ambiguities are used to deter any debate on weapons 
systems which do not meet “high-levels” of autonomy, even though such systems clearly still 
pose vast ethical dilemmas. Jeangène Vilmer thus believes that a better and ‘wider option is 
to install safeguards’.102 One of the safeguards he proposes is to only allow these weapons to 
be used against material targets such as tanks and aircraft.103 Vilmer argues that such a 
restriction avoids the problem of allowing systems to decide whether someone is a combatant 
or a civilian.104 However, the clear problem with this position is that anti-material machines 
can still kill people, as people are often in/with/next to material. 
Alternatively, Arkin has proposed regulation of autonomous weapons via a test.105 The Arkin 
Test states that a machine can be employed when it can be shown that it can respect the laws 
of war as well or better than a human in similar circumstances.106 Some scholars have argued 
that if a machine passes this test, we have a moral obligation to deploy it, as it may work to 
uphold IHL better than ever before.107 There are many opponents to such a test. Sparrow, for 
example, has noted that Arkin’s argument ‘depends on adopting a consequentialist ethical 
framework that is concerned only with the reduction of civilian casualties’.108 Thus, while 
such a machine could be justified based on statistics, this avoids the fact that the IHL 
standard for the protection of civilian life should be perfection. Noting that a machine may 
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kill less does not make those deaths acceptable.109 Further to this, suggesting that these 
machines could follow IHL better than humans ignores the fact that IHL is not just a set of 
clear cut rules but requires very complex decision-making processes,110 even within the 
confines of set Rules of Engagement. Arkin has suggested that these issues could be resolved 
with a backup system whereby the machine would refer to a human every time it has to make 
complex ethical decisions.111 However, the decision as to whether a machine is or should be 
in doubt or not also remains complex and mistakes could still be made, leading Sparrow to 
declare that ‘if we can’t trust a machine to reliably make ethical judgements, we cannot trust 
it to identify when its judgements might be unreliable’.112 
4.0 An Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems 
4.1 Challenging the Humanist Discourse around Autonomous Weapons: A Posthuman 
Analysis 
 
Despite the challenges posed, calls for a ban remain strong. However, there are very large 
differences between the people who call for a ban. NGOs, for example, tend to take a 
humanitarian stance, noting the need to promote a humanist ethics and uphold the rules of 
IHL. Alternatively, however, there are those in this group who do not fundamentally come 
from a humanist background but come from the perspective of futurism.113 Whilst the 
position of NGOs comes from the humanist discourse of IHL and the need to protect human 
life over all others, aligning more with the human dignity standpoint of religious leaders, 
some tech experts like Elon Musk fully embrace the posthuman future while working to 
ensure that this future remains ethical, albeit working within the confines of capitalism.114 
The will to construct the future from the now can be seen through the project OpenAI, which 
Musk co-founded.115 OpenAI is a project which seeks to disrupt the current corporate trend in 
AI research, where most of the research into AI is being done by large companies such as 
Google or in research centres such as MIT, with many of the findings of this research kept 
private in the hope of using them for profit. OpenAI is a non-profit organisation which seeks 
to disrupt corporate monopolies on AI research by committing to make all of its research and 
patents public, as well as through offering to work freely with any group or organisation.116 
Noting the threat AI could pose to humanity, OpenAI aims to create a friendly General 
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Artificial Intelligence (GAI) - a system which can do more than just one thing such as speak 
or play chess; one which has ‘human’ characteristics.117 OpenAI thus represents a clear, 
strategic effort to disrupt current trends in technology and AI development, including the will 
to make profit, aiming to bring a different ethical standpoint to the realm of AI research 
working, hopefully, to create a better future.118 
All the groups who call for a preventative ban fundamentally agree that machines should not 
make life/death decisions. However, while NGOs seek to protect humans now within the 
confines of the present, with the risk of becoming out of date, futurist tech experts 
fundamentally believe that ‘the best way to predict the future is to invent it’.119 OpenAI 
represents a move towards shaping technological advancement now to prevent the existence 
of killer machines. Such aims are very similar to xenofeminist aims: the wish to appropriate 
technology for feminist aims. Whilst xenofeminism does not explicitly address the threat to 
life technology could pose, I argue that the wish to define and use technology for feminist 
aims inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ‘friendly’.120 While 
OpenAI wishes to create a friendly AI, however, they do not explicitly define what ‘friendly’ 
means. Xenofeminism, on the other hand, is explicitly informed by a feminist ethos which 
seeks to ensure that ‘friendly’ means non-killer as a minimum. There is a need, as I will 
suggest, to bring these two bodies of thought together. Gender theory is required in this area 
due to its long history of theorising and applying a set of complex and nuanced tools which 
seek to promote equality and justice, these ethics forming what I argue should constitute 
‘friendly’ technology. 
While there is a need to ensure that IHL is upheld and that robots do not kill, it is also clear 
that this ethical dilemma does not just apply to autonomous weapons. While the organisations 
mentioned above clearly have at least some form anti-militarism as a core aim,121 the 
temporal horizon of such NGOs remains limited. NGOs largely maintain a strict humanist 
stance, focusing on the realm of international law and the need to promote and protect 
existing legal frameworks such as IHL which situate the human at the centre of the paradigm. 
Whilst this has historically produced many great achievements, such a humanist stance 
cannot be applied given the rapid pace at which technology is now developing. AI may not 
only pose a threat to the lives of humans where designed, purposefully, to kill, but may also 
pose a threat to life in and of itself, as it exists. There is a need for all groups who are 
working to promote ethical technologies to consider not only what may seem attainable now, 
but what is feasibly attainable in the future, noting the ways in which the now can be used to 
construct the future. 
NGOs continue to situate the human as the centre of their paradigm, seeing the machine as 
the ‘other’ to the human. This can be seen in the way in which autonomy is discussed in 
relation to the human who is imagined as either in/on/out of the loop, which does not account 
for the ways in which humans and machines work in connection.122 Posthumanism, on the 
other hand, challenges the centrality of the human within Western thinking, working to re-
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think the human/machine binary. Feminist posthumanism notes that something else is 
needed; a new way of defining subjectivity which sees the complexities and interconnections 
between humans and others: nature, technology, animals, etc., rejecting the human as the 
central paradigm and noting how the human is located instead ‘in the flow of relations with 
multiple others’.123 The humanist discourse around autonomous weapons ignores the 
posthuman reality that humans and machines are already working in connection with one 
another. Life/death decisions are already being made by human-machine combinations, as the 
next section illustrates. Banning autonomous weapons is not enough: there is a need to 
consider the ways in which machines are already making these decisions and to create ethical 
frameworks for these and future technologies, rebutting the false exceptionalisation which 
surrounds the current discourse on autonomous weapons. 
4.2 Machine-Human Life/Death Decision Making 
 
As Jasanoff notes, technology is based around a set of decisions.124 Jasanoff observes that we 
often do not question these decisions until there is an accident – at which point we find who 
made the mistake.125 However, she argues that people ‘have spent a great deal more energy 
thinking about how to make good laws than about how to design good technological 
objects’.126 Yet, she continues, ‘in democratic societies, uncontrolled delegation of power is 
seen as a basic threat to freedom’.127 We must ‘understand how power is delegated to 
technological systems’.128 
The need to understand how power and decision-making are delegated to technology is ever 
more urgent in the realm of life/death decision-making. However, as noted, the humanist 
discourse on autonomous weapons fails to account for the ways in which humans and 
machines are already working together to make life/death decisions. The most obvious 
example is the use of programming and algorithms in drone warfare. While many drone 
strikes are conducted as ‘personality strikes’ – i.e. strikes on a particular, key, well-known 
person – these occur only a few times a year, with ‘signature strikes’ happening a few times a 
week.129 These attacks are conducted on the basis of a ‘pattern of life’ analysis. ‘Pattern of 
life’ analysis develops a profile of an individual or a network of individuals by drawing on all 
the intelligence available, which includes things like drone and other aerial surveillance 
intelligence, communications interceptions, as well as phone tapping information and GPS 
tracking information.130 What becomes clear in ‘drone warfare’, therefore, is that the drone 
itself is only one part of a broader system which includes big data, algorithms, intelligence 
collection, chains of command, and bureaucratic formations, among other technologies and 
practices.131 This data is then often combined with individual tracking through the use of 
mobile phone and GPS tracking systems in order to both watch movements as well as to 
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target individuals.132 The gathering of this information builds up to create a file of 
information collected by machines which, as Chamayou has noted ‘once it becomes thick 
enough, will constitute a death warrant’.133 This is an example of part-machine life/death 
decision-making. Part of the decision-making process here is already done by machines 
which gather this data and predict the likelihood of an individual’s involvement with terrorist 
organisations. While the human is clearly involved, in that they then must note the results of 
the data collected, deem it enough to act upon and then operate the drone to kill the subject in 
question, the machine and the human are making life/death decisions together. It is also 
worth nothing, as Wilcox has shown, the ways in which this data is often interpreted in 
racialised and gendered ways.134 
Such processes of human-machine life/death decision-making would not be covered under a 
ban of autonomous weapons. It thus seems that part of the problem with the debate around 
autonomous weapons is the debate around autonomy itself. By trying to define autonomy 
instead of working to understand automation and autonomy as in continuum, international 
debates on autonomous weapons other the machine from the human, creating a false 
paradigm. Such a limited account of autonomy works to set the standard so high for machine 
decision-making that, in the end, almost nothing may be covered under a ban. In the 
meantime, machines are already making of life/death decisions alongside humans. Machine 
involvement in such decision-making processes is only set to increase, as the next section 
will illustrate. 
4.3 Cyborg Super Soldiers 
As Vinge states, ‘in humans, the hardest development problems have already been solved. 
Building up from within ourselves ought to be easier than figuring out first what we really are 
and then building machine that are all of that [as per AI]’.135 While beyond human 
intelligence is often discussed in reference to AI, this is only one model. In fact, 
superintelligence and the singularity following it is likely to occur through what Vinge 
defines as Intelligence Amplification (IA). IA may include, for example, large computer 
networks waking up and becoming superhumanly intelligent or ‘computer/human interfaces 
may become so intimate that users may reasonably be considered superhumanly 
intelligent’.136 These two examples are different to AI as they either come from ‘upgrading’ 
the human or from the computer finding its own intelligence rather than coming from a 
specially created machine. 
Given current trends and advancements in both wearable military technologies and human 
enhancement technologies, in contrast to the vast technological problems in creating a 
humanoid killer robot, the future of autonomous weapons may lie more in the enhancement 
of human soldiers than in the machinic ‘other’. Superhuman soldiers, however, would not be 
covered under the kinds of legal bans being proposed. Of course, such a soldier would not 
necessarily be called a weapon and would pose a different set of legal and ethical questions 
considering that the entity would remain human to some extent, possibly retaining human 
choice capacity and empathy.137 However, it is also unclear at what point a technologically 
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enhanced human may be deemed to be more machine than human. For example, as noted 
above, emotions in military contexts are often deemed to be a weakness by many who then 
use this argument to justify autonomous weapons.138 Following this line of argument, it is 
feasible to consider that attempts may be made to make superhuman soldiers emotionless to 
make them more efficient. It is at this point – where some parts of the soldier’s humanity may 
be lost – that the ethics of autonomous weapons may begin to apply directly to cyborg 
soldiers. Superhuman soldiers thus exemplify the false binaries between autonomy and 
automation and the human and the machine in that they will likely embody all these things at 
once in a very direct way. 
Recent trends in military technologies exemplify the trend towards creating enhanced human 
cyborg super-soldiers. Wearable military technologies are being developed to make human 
soldiers more efficient, as with exoskeletons. Designed to make soldiers stronger and to help 
disabled soldiers get back to work, the development and use of exoskeletons is one step 
towards the creation of super-soldiers.139 Many of these wearable military technologies are 
being used not only to increase strength but to make life/death decision making more 
efficient. An example of such a technology can be seen in the Boomerang gunfire location 
system. Boomerang pinpoints the exact location of incoming small arms fire using acoustic 
detection and sophisticated algorithms. This information is then related directly to the soldier 
who can choose whether to fire or not.140 Initially mounted onto trucks, there is now also a 
soldier wearable system called the Boomerang Warrior-X. While the system still requires a 
soldier to use the information given to choose whether to fire, these examples not only show 
the ways in which the human-machine are already working together to make life/death 
decisions, but also highlight the trend in working to create a new breed of super-soldier. If 
one merges the data collection and profiling used in drone warfare and gives this to a soldier 
in an exoskeleton using a system such as Boomerang Warrior-X, an early form of 
superhuman soldier can already be seen to be emerging. 
While human enhancement technology is rather limited at this point, it is developing. One 
clear example of a research project which could contribute to the creation of superhuman 
soldiers can be seen in HRL's Information & System Sciences Laboratory’s transcranial 
direct current stimulation project.141 The researchers in this project ‘measured the brain 
activity patterns of six commercial and military pilots and the transmitted these patterns into 
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novice subjects as they learned to pilot an airplane in a realistic flight stimulator’.142 The 
study found that ‘subjects who received brain stimulation via electrode-embedded head caps 
improved their piloting abilities’.143 This demonstrates a possible way to decrease the time it 
takes to learn complex skills, given that ‘commercial and military pilot training programs 
[already] now utilize flight simulation extensively for training basic flight and combat 
skills’.144 As the researchers on the project note, such a study could have massive ‘benefits 
for commercial and military applications’.145 This exemplifies a further way in which 
technology is being developed in various contexts with the idea of creating superhuman 
soldiers.  
Given current trends in wearable military technologies and the large investment in human 
enhancement technologies globally, as opposed to the vast technological problems in creating 
a humanoid killer robot,146 the future of autonomous weapons may not be solely machinic at 
all; rather, they are likely to take the form of a cyborg soldier. Discussions on autonomous 
weapons, however, continue to assert autonomous systems as the machinic ‘other’. Such 
definitions which define these technologies before they exist may drastically limit the impact 
of any legal regulation despite the clear ethical and legal issues which arise from the 
possibility of any form of autonomous killer technology. It is clear that a feminist posthuman 
approach is needed on such technologies to ensure that the full range of technologies which 
may kill may be captured through legal regulation. 
5.0 Conclusions 
Despite current trends in military technologies and the ways in which machines are already 
helping to make life/death decisions, neither algorithmic ‘independence’, nor AI which 
decides to kill, nor any type of superhuman soldier would be covered under a pre-emptive 
ban of autonomous weapons. On the other hand, a posthuman approach to autonomous 
weapons would recognise the connections between the human and the machine. Such an 
approach would not fixate on autonomy but would instead work to break down the false 
dichotomies between autonomy-automation and human-machine, instead focusing on the 
ethical implications of killer systems across these lines.147 As noted above, whilst 
xenofeminism and posthuman feminism understand the dangers as well as the potentials of 
technology, xenofeminism in particular does not account for the power of militarism and the 
militarism-capitalism assemblage. It seems, therefore, that the risks of the technology-
militarism-capitalism assemblage need to be further read into xenofeminism to ensure that it 
stays true to its own aims of using and appropriating technology to construct an intersectional 
feminist future. 
Braidotti’s posthumanism pays attention to death and modes of dying while promoting an 
affirmative posthuman era in the face of the necropolitical.148 In contrast to the necropolitical 
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politics of death itself,149 Braidotti proposes ‘a politics of life itself’150 which chooses to 
tackle the obstacles of the posthuman condition as they come. She thus states: 
It is a constant challenge for us to rise to the occasion, to be ‘worthy of our times’, 
while resisting them, and thus to practise amor fati affirmatively. It is quite 
demanding to catch the wave of life’s intensities in a secular manner and ride on it, 
exposing the boundaries or limits as we transgress them... Death is the ultimate 
transposition, though it is not final, as zoe carries on, relentlessly.151 
It seems hard, however, to read autonomous weapons in the affirmative when weapons 
technologies kill people in ever more removed and de-personalised ways. Autonomous 
weapons, are/will be the child of the military economy. As Braidotti notes, however, to 
analyse in the affirmative is not to deny the horror of our times. Affirmation ‘proposes a 
different way of dealing with’ such horrors.152 
I propose that xenofeminism provides an affirmative blueprint for embracing the current 
times. I have noted how xenofeminist method works to appropriate technology and existing 
political structures, bending them to feminist aims.153 While the current form of 
xenofeminism does not fully account for the links between technology and militarism, this 
does not mean that xenofeminism cannot accommodate such concerns. Xenofeminist method 
is an affirmative approach in that it notes the contradictions and risks in the posthuman 
condition and works to deconstruct them. 
Thus, taking an affirmative posthuman-xenofeminist perspective, one which understands the 
ways in which the human and the machine are deeply interconnected, I wish to use 
xenofeminist method – the appropriation of technology for feminist aims – to propose a 
posthuman-xenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons. While the XFM does not 
explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, the wish to define and use 
technology for feminist aims, I have already suggested, inherently includes the wish to ensure 
that technology remains ethical. Taking this further, it is important to note that anti-militarism 
is a key part of the feminist project as exemplified by the Women’s Peace Conference of 
1915, to the feminist activism of Greenham Common to the ways in which Haraway, in her 
early foundational works, highlighted anti-militarism as a key feminist project.154  While 
there are many feminists who do not promote an anti-violence stance, choosing to fight as 
part of their feminism, for example, this does not preclude an anti-militarism stance in the 
realm of military technologies.155  Neither does an anti-militarism stance in this area wish to 
judge those who engage in fighting as part of their feminist project as ‘not feminists’, nor to 
associate feminism inherently with peace. Rather, in noting the history of anti-militarism 
within the international feminist project, I wish to suggest that there is a need to promote an 
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ethics of anti-militarism at the international structural level. This is precisely because of the 
ways in which militarism structures the global order, working to structure technological 
innovation and development alongside forces such as capitalism, colonialism and other power 
structures. Such a stance must therefore be contrasted to more contextual scenarios, where 
fighting may indeed be the best form of feminist response. In this sense, anti-militarism must 
be distinguished from an anti-violence position, with anti-militarism aiming to challenge the 
industrial, technologically crafted, capitalist driven military complex and with an anti-
violence position calling more broadly for peace and non-violence. It thus follows, given the 
links between militarism, technological advancements and capitalism, that xenofeminism, as 
a project aiming to appropriate technology for feminist aims, must have regard for anti-
militarism. A xenofeminist appropriation of technology must therefore include the desire to 
ensure that the technology of the now and future cannot be used either for military gains or 
for the taking of human or nonhuman life.156 Xenofeminist method provides an affirmative 
method for dealing with the current times and the issue of military technologies. 
Drawing on the will to appropriate technology for feminist aims and to create the future from 
the present, manipulating, hacking and coding the system, it seems that the appropriation of 
technology includes ensuring that technology can only be developed in ethical ways. 
Technology is dependent on a set of programming choices which will shape machine 
intelligence as technology advances. What choices are made now, what programming choices 
are made in these current times, could structure the entire future of technology and machine 
intelligence. There is a need for feminist posthuman perspectives and xenofeminist 
infiltrations now. 
The xenofeminists know well that it matters who makes those programming choices. As 
Haraway puts it, ‘it matters which figures figure figures, which systems systematize 
systems’.157 Noting that ‘technology isn’t inherently progressive’, the xenofeminists call for 
an intervention in these choices.158 While intelligent machines could indeed be the end of 
humanity, such machines may not make such choices. It is important to get the now right in 
the hope of working towards a future where the machine-human can work together ethically. 
As Haraway notes, ‘the machine is use, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can 
be responsible for machines: they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for 
boundaries; we are they’.159 
The XFM advocates the infiltration of multiple discourses.160 I propose this could include 
law. I have argued that the discourse on autonomous weapons needs to be made posthuman, 
emphasising the links between the machine and the human and the ways in which seeing the 
autonomous weapon as the machinic other is a fallacy. Xenofeminist method calls for the 
appropriation of technology to promote, in Braidotti’s terms, affirmative aims:  constructing 
the future from the now. While many of the groups calling for a legal ban of autonomous 
weapons may be overlooking some of the nuances in the debate and definitions, their larger 
goal – to seek legal frameworks to regulate these systems – is an aim which can remain 
useful. After all, legal regulation is a core manner in which profit-making tech creators may 
be forced to shape their innovations in ethical ways. In other words, a xenofeminist method 
may include not only the appropriation of technology itself but also the frameworks which 
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regulate it. These frameworks are key in structuring future developments of technology, and 
thus work to appropriate technology through structuring the creation of technology from the 
outset. In line with xenofeminist method, therefore, I propose that a legal framework is 
needed to ensure that feminist ethics of anti-militarism, justice and intersectionality remain 
central to technological innovation. A feminist posthuman understanding of technology is 
required here: to ensure that the dark sides of technology are evaded whilst technology’s 
positive, subjectivity challenging and capitalism destroying potential is maintained. There is a 
need to focus on the regulation of all technologies, given the real possibility that killer 
machines may be created in multiple ways. 
There have been steps in other contexts towards creating broader ethical regulations for 
technology. This can be seen in the example of the European Parliament resolution of 16 
February 2017, which makes recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics.161 The resolution is well thought out, considering a variety of issues around the 
legal regulation of technology and noting issues around liability, care robots, autonomous 
vehicles and privacy issues.162 The resolution calls for the urgent need to regulate 
technologies.163 While the resolution opens up debate on these issues, it is non-binding and 
seeks to regulate non-military technologies, thus upholding a false binary between military 
and civil technologies despite the clear cross-overs. As noted above, many civil technologies 
are originally created for military purposes, and there also remains a risk that civil intelligent 
technologies may decide to kill or may be easily adapted to make them kill.164 In addition, the 
resolution does not consider human enhancement technologies despite emerging 
developments in this area. This trend towards focusing on the immediate present and towards 
categorising military and non-military technologies separately is repeated throughout legal 
and policy attempts to regulate these technologies. There is an urgent need for a posthuman-
xenofeminist infiltration of the discussions around the legal regulation of technology, 
working to promote a future-facing feminist posthuman perspective which understands the 
cross-overs between civil and military technologies, the human and the machine, and 
autonomy and automation. While technology may be largely controlled at present by a 
capitalist elite with strong ties to militarism, this does not mean this technology will 
inevitably remain in their hands and under their control. By ensuring that basic ethical 
principles are applied now, through the application of laws to regulate programming choices 
and technological innovation in the present, technology can be shaped, working towards a 
post capitalist, fairer, more ethical and just, feminist world. 
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